Are law schools prepared for a multi-year cycle of substantial declines in 1L enrollment?

While 1L JD enrollment hit a nine-year high this year, Dean Paul Caron has been tracking the declining figures for the upcoming year. Maybe that’s not too bad for law schools, given that they’ve seen this growth and are, perhaps, a bit more able to insulate it against it next year. Applicants might end up looking more like 2020 levels rather than 2021 levels.

But another thing to watch? Test-takers are cratering. LSAT test-takers could be applying in this cycle or for a future cycle, of course. But first-time LSAT LSAT test-takers for August 2021 dropped from 17,113 in August 2022 to 15,888. Again, many of these are likely applying for the Fall 2022 admissions class. October 2020 first-time test-takers were 11,868; that fell to 10,813 in October 2021.

It’s been getting worse. November saw a drop from 12,504 in 2020 to 10,010 in 2021. And January went from 11,313 first-time test-takers in 2021 to just 7244 in 2022.

The later in the cycle it gets, the more these tests are likely to portend figures for the next cycle. And they suggest a fairly significant decline for the Fall 2023 cycle.

Which law schools have grown and shrunk the most since 2015?

Law school 1L enrollment bottomed out in 2015, and it has seen a fairly steady (if not always consistent) improvement ever since. 1L enrollment in 2015-2016 was 37,071, the lowest since 1973-1974 (when there were about 50 fewer ABA-accredited law schools). Enrollment has risen to 41,710, up 12.5% from that low.

What schools have grown the most since then? And which have shrunk? A few schools have closed, of course, or have given up ABA accreditation.

27 schools have classes at least 50% larger than 2015, with 6 law school growing more than 100%. It’s a mix of newer schools growing, reorganized schools rebounding, strategic shrinking in 2015 now rebounding, new capital for schools to grow, capitalizing on other regional law school closures, and other assorted reasons, I’d say. (There’s also year-to-year fluctuation, and there’s no guarantee these schools were at their lowest ebb in 2015.)

	1Ls 2015	1Ls 2021	Delta
Charleston	85	270	217.6%
New Hampshire	76	219	188.2%
Liberty	51	133	160.8%
Lincoln Memorial	50	125	150.0%
Seton Hall	151	354	134.4%
Toledo	70	159	127.1%
New England Law | Boston	198	392	98.0%
Widener-Commonwealth	66	125	89.4%
Appalachian	33	62	87.9%
Loyola-Chicago	206	381	85.0%
UMass-Darmouth	71	126	77.5%
Northeastern	140	239	70.7%
Albany	126	215	70.6%
Widener-Delaware	154	261	69.5%
George Mason	157	262	66.9%
Baylor	131	213	62.6%
Southern	210	340	61.9%
Belmont	89	144	61.8%
Tulsa	86	139	61.6%
Connecticut	96	153	59.4%
Nebraska	102	161	57.8%
Pace	198	312	57.6%
Texas	265	417	57.4%
St. Thomas (Minnesota)	103	162	57.3%
Gonzaga	127	193	52.0%
Boston College	234	353	50.9%
Penn State-Dickinson	64	96	50.0%

Schools that shrank were less common and did so less dramatically. 13 schools saw 1L enrollment declines of at least 15% between 2015 and 2021, and only one exceeding 50%. (Again, there’s year-to-year fluctuation, or temporary decisions to reduce class size to offset a recent larger class, among other reasons.)

	1Ls 2015	1Ls 2021	Delta
Western Michigan University	448	188	-58.0%
Atlanta's John Marshall	239	130	-45.6%
Puerto Rico	198	124	-37.4%
San Francisco	205	148	-27.8%
Southern Illinois	121	89	-26.4%
Florida	310	241	-22.3%
District of Columbia	93	74	-20.4%
Florida A&M	159	130	-18.2%
Richmond	175	145	-17.1%
Michigan State	280	234	-16.4%
Western State College of Law	131	110	-16.0%
Colorado	204	172	-15.7%
Northern Kentucky	169	143	-15.4%

Non-LSAT standardized test scores in admissions remain concentrated at a handful of schools

The ABA requires law schools to disclose when they have 10 or more enrolled students in an incoming class who were admitted using a standardized test other than the LSAT; and the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentile scores of that cohort. Sixteen schools reported at least 10 students admitted under such programs: 12 using the GRE, 3 using the ACT, and 1 using the GMAT.

Northwestern had 11 students admitted under the GMAT, 4.7% of the class.

BYU (19 students, 14.3%), Northern Illinois (10 students, 8.5%), and Georgia (10 students, 5.2%) were the three schools with ACT admissions.

And the 12 schools using the GRE:

Hawaii (24, 24.5%)

Arizona (20, 16.4%)

Penn State-Dickinson (10, 10.8%)

Harvard (36, 9.7%)

New Hampshire (20, 9.1%)

Georgetown (44, 8.5%)

Cornell (10, 5.3%)

Cal Western (12, 5.0%)

Columbia (18, 4.2%)

NYU (16, 3.5%)

Boston College (12, 3.5%)

Penn (10, 3.5%)

That’s 232 students admitted at these 12 schools under the GRE. Other schools may have admitted GRE students, but in smaller numbers. UPDATE: The ABA has supplemented this data, which will be the subject of another post.

Another interesting question to consider—do admissions for these students look different than LSAT admissions?

This is a complicated question, and it actually reveals a difference between ETS and USNWR. The bottom line, before you read everything below, is that USNWR appears to treat the GRE materially worse than ETS recommends; and it appears that admissions are, on the whole, a bit easier for GRE students.

USNWR converts GRE scores to percentile equivalents and weighs them against LSAT percentile equivalents. (It apparently does not do so for GMAT or ACT scores.) Now, it’s worth emphasizing that it does not appear that this is how ETS’s own studies of the validity of the GRE worked compared to the LSAT, as detailed in the ABA-commissioned study to examine the ETS report. (More on that in a moment.)

Here’s USNWR’s methodology:

These are the combined median scores on the LSAT and GRE quantitative, verbal and analytical writing exams of all 2020 full- and part-time entrants to the J.D. program. Reported scores for each of the four exams, when applicable, were converted to 0-100 percentile scales. The LSAT and GRE percentile scales were weighted by the proportions of test-takers submitting each exam. For example, if 85% of exams submitted were LSATs and 15% submitted were GREs, the LSAT percentile would be multiplied by 0.85 and the average percentile of the three GRE exams by 0.15 before summing the two values. This means GRE scores were never converted to LSAT scores or vice versa. There were 60 law schools – 31% of the total ranked – that reported both the LSAT and GRE scores of their 2020 entering classes to U.S. News.

It’s not clear where percentile equivalents come from, but the latest LSAC percentile equivalent tables cover 2019-2020, whereas the latest ETS percentile equivalent tables cover 2017-2020.

The first thing we can do, then, is to look at the 50th percentile LSAT scores for the incoming classes at each of these law schools:

	LSAT	19-20 pct
Harvard	174	99.2%
Columbia	174	99.2%
NYU	172	98.4%
Georgetown	171	97.8%
Cornell	171	97.8%
Penn	171	97.8%
Boston College	165	89.8%
Arizona	163	85.0%
Penn State - Dickinson	161	80.1%
New Hampshire	158	70.4%
Hawaii	156	62.9%
Cal Western	153	51.7%

Next, sticking with the same order, let’s look at the 50th percentile of the GRE-V, GRE-Q, and GRE-AW scores. At the end, I aggregate them, weighing each 1/3 like USNWR does, to give an overall percentile total. (There is tremendous compression in the GRE-AW scores, as you can readily see.)

	GRE-V	17-20 pct	GRE-Q	17-20 pct	GRE-AW	17-20 pct	GRE pct
Harvard	165	96%	158	64%	5	91%	83.7%
Columbia	167	98%	163	79%	5	91%	89.3%
NYU	155	67%	153	46%	4	54%	55.7%
Georgetown	159	82%	158	64%	4.5	80%	75.3%
Cornell	153	59%	152	43%	4	54%	52.0%
Penn	166	97%	162	76%	5	91%	88.0%
Boston College	165	96%	163	79%	5	91%	88.7%
Arizona	162	90%	157	61%	4.5	80%	77.0%
Penn State - Dickinson	152	53%	149	32%	4.5	80%	55.0%
New Hampshire	162	90%	163	79%	5	91%	86.7%
Hawaii	153	59%	146	21%	4.5	80%	53.3%
Cal Western	162	90%	161	74%	5	91%	85.0%

Now I’ll compare those percentile equivalents with the LSAT percentiles to see if the admitted students in the GRE cohort have a higher or lower composite percentile equivalent than the LSAT cohort. One more feature: I’ll reverse-engineer the GRE percentile equivalent to its LSAT score (rounding to the nearest LSAT score, or in one place identifying the two scores it falls between) for some idea of what it looks like. UPDATE: I’ve been told that USNWR does not weigh the GRE sections equally. But because it does not disclose its methodology, I am awaiting an answer on how it does weigh them.

	LSAT	19-20 pct	GRE pct	Delta	LSAT equivalent
Harvard	174	99.2%	83.7%	-15.5	162
Columbia	174	99.2%	89.3%	-9.9	165
NYU	172	98.4%	55.7%	-42.7	154
Georgetown	171	97.8%	75.3%	-22.5	159/160
Cornell	171	97.8%	52.0%	-45.8	153
Penn	171	97.8%	88.0%	-9.8	164
Boston College	165	89.8%	88.7%	-1.1	165
Arizona	163	85.0%	77.0%	-8.0	160
Penn State - Dickinson	161	80.1%	55.0%	-25.1	154
New Hampshire	158	70.4%	86.7%	16.3	164
Hawaii	156	62.9%	53.3%	-9.6	153
Cal Western	153	51.7%	85.0%	33.3	163

One more: ETS also has a “comparison tool” for law schools. As mentioned, the ETS methodology for the relationship between the LSAT and the GRE is not the one USNWR is using. Instead, it is based on a different methodology that, as far as I know, has not been disclosed. But you can use an ETS calculator to determine a “predicted LSAT score,” within “5 points.” The calculator only uses the GRE-V and GRE-Q. What outputs do we get from this proprietary engine for each school?

	LSAT	GRE-V	GRE-Q	Predicted LSAT
Harvard	174	165	158	168
Columbia	174	167	163	172
NYU	172	155	153	157
Georgetown	171	159	158	163
Cornell	171	153	152	156
Penn	171	166	162	171
Boston College	165	165	163	169
Arizona	163	162	157	165
Penn State - Dickinson	161	152	149	154
New Hampshire	158	162	163	168
Hawaii	156	153	146	153
Cal Western	153	162	161	167

Note that the ETS “predicted” LSAT is higher—in some cases, much higher—than the USNWR formula.

At many schools, it’s still lower than the median LSAT score, but often not as dramatically different; at a few others, it’s higher (and at more than just the two schools in the USNWR table above).

So if schools were going by the ETS data and admitting comparable students, they will be penalized by USNWR, which has adopted a methodology that ETS does not use:

Why not compare the reported percentiles for the GRE and LSAT?

Percentiles represent how a test taker performed relative to other test takers who recently took the same test. The current test taker populations for the GRE General Test and LSAT exam are likely different in terms of background and ability, so the percentiles calculated for each test based on those different populations are not directly comparable. Additionally, reported percentiles for any test vary over time as the test taking population changes. Both GRE and LSAT scores are meant to be consistent across time and changes in test taking populations, so the most consistent and accurate comparisons are based on the statistical relationship between the reported scores, as provided by the Comparison Tool.

It appears that at many schools, the GRE cohort has lower incoming student credentials than the LSAT cohort. How much that affects USNWR rankings depends on the size, of course.

Now, at most of these schools, it’s a relatively small part of the incoming class. It might be that these are disproportionately joint degree students, for example. At institutions with n=10, it tells us very little about the overall class. We also don’t see all the other schools with n<10 and what they’re doing. But it’s worth noting that GRE admissions do not appear to be taking place in lockstep with LSAT admissions at most institutions.

This post has been updated and modified based on feedback received. Thanks for helpful suggestions.

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Select posts from the Election Law Blog in 2021

After I joined the Election Law Blog as a contributor this summer, I significantly cut back on blogging election law-related items here at Excess of Democracy. Below are select posts I contributed to ELB this year, principally longer posts with more substantive analysis.

When has a state enacted a “new hurdle” to voting? (July 14, 2021)

Court concludes California candidate tax disclosure law applies only to gubernatorial primaries, not recalls (July 21, 2021)

Weighing risks to the 2024 Electoral College (August 8, 2021)

Qualifications for candidates running in California’s gubernatorial recall (August 17, 2021)

Nationwide preclearance of existing voter identification laws in the John L. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act (August 20, 2021)

Rebutting some of the claims in the Eastman memo about Congress’s role in counting electoral votes (September 21, 2021)

Latest statement on Eastman still relies on the unilateral power of the Vice President to ignore the Electoral Count Act (October 11, 2021)

Ballot access rules for disqualified presidential candidates (October 20, 2021)

Will Laurence Tribe draft his own Eastman memo for January 6, 2025? (November 1, 2021)

Can federal courts hear private litigants’ statewide partisan gerrymandering claims arising under the Freedom to Vote Act? (December 28, 2021)

After 50% drop in 1L academic dismissals in 2020, little increase in 2L academic dismissals in 2021

Last year, I flagged the sharp decline in 1L academic dismissals in 2020. 1L academic dismissals declined by more than 50%. I wondered if moving to pass-fail grading made schools reluctant to academically evaluate 1Ls with typical academic dismissal, and I wondered if we’d see an increase in 2L academic dismissals this year.

Cumulative 1L academic attrition rebounded to its 2019 level. But 2L academic attrition rose only slightly compared to 2020 and remained below 2019. (I also include “other” attrition, which includes withdrawals among other catch-call categories, for some comparison, too.)

	1L Attrition		2L Attrition
	Acadmic	Other	Academic	Other
2019	1186	219	1012	241
2020	545	113	841	240
2021	1113	296	940	309

In short, it seems a good number of 1Ls reaped a benefit of pass-fail grading in the Spring 2020 and avoided academic dismissal. That’s great news for 1Ls who spent 2 years in law school and can finish their third year to earn a JD. On the back end, it remains to be seen whether these students have more difficulty passing the bar exam. But it doesn’t appear most schools returned to now-2Ls to revisit their academic performance.

Law school 1L JD enrollment climbs to 9-year high as non-JD enrollment dips slightly

The 2020 law school enrollment figures have been released. They show the best first-year JD enrollment in a long time and a bit of a drop in non-JD enrollment. About 15% of law school enrollees are not enrolled in a JD program.

For the last seven years, 1L JD enrollment has been between 37,000 and 38,500, remarkable consistency. This year, it’s up to 41,710. That’s the biggest class since 2012-2013, which had an incoming class of 44,481. increase in the quality and quantity of applicants surely fueled the growth.

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Total JD enrollment also increased slightly to 117,501, the highest figure since 119,775 in 2014-2015 (but still well off the peak of 2010-2011 with 147,525).

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But non-JD enrollment is a different story. For the first time in a long time, non-JD enrollment declined. Last year, I thought pandemic-related travel restrictions coupled with some Department of Education regulations might have dampened the market for at least some foreign-educated non-JD enrollment. It might be that it’s catching up to some schools.

The ABA changed its definitions a few years ago, which resulted in a spike in reported non-JD enrollment, and despite the decline this year overall enrollment remains strong. (It’s also worth noting that those enrolled in both JD and non-JD programs simultaneously, at least in recent years, are counted in each set, so this slightly overstates, to an unknown degree, non-JD enrollment.)

21,044 were enrolled in non-JD programs, a drop of around 250 students over last year. It’s now about 15% of all law school enrollment.

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Here I also highlight a handful of schools with the highest non-JD enrollment as a percentage of total law school enrollment. There are a few heavy-hitters that are driving a lot of the non-JD enrollment.

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Lower California bar exam cut score yields modest increases in pass rates and decline in repeaters, but increase in attorneys appears to slow

Earlier this year, I looked at the change in California’s bar exam cut score (from 144 to 139), and what it looked like for the October 2020 bar exam. Unsurprisingly, bar passage rates jumped, especially among repeaters.

The July 2021 exam is now the third exam with the lower cut score. It’s yielded a couple of results (statistics here) that are interesting, in my view. First, repeaters have declined significantly, and pass rates for repeaters have returned to a fairly low level. Second, there has not been a significant uptick in new attorneys admitted to California this year.

Among first-time test-takers of the general bar exam who graduated from ABA-approved law schools, we’ve seen a relatively steady decline in overall test-takers. When the cut score was lowered in 2020, we saw a jump in passers. (The July 2020 exam was moved to October due to Covid-19 concerns.) The pass rate jumped from 71.7% in July 2019 to 82.4% in October 2020. It fell slightly to 78.9% this year (but still an increase, albeit a bit more modest compared to 2019). But all that’s much better than the 60-something% pass rates in July 2016, 2017, & 2018.

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Over to repeaters. We saw a surge in repeaters in October 2020 among ABA-accredited schools, and a surge in those passing. Repeaters increased from 1368 in July 2019 to 1645 in October 2020. And the repeater pass rate climbed, too, from 34.6% to 49.7%. But this July, we saw a sharp decline to just 839 test-takers, and the pass rate fell to just 26.1%.

The decline in repeaters is no surprise—as more people pass the first time, we’d expect repeaters to drop, too. But the decline in the pass rate, I think, also shows that the lower cut score is sweeping in those most likely to ultimately pass. Those who are not passing with the new, lower cut score may be increasingly distant in scores, at the lower end of the bell curve if you will.

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One potential benefit of the new, lower cut score would be more attorneys admitted to California, which would increase availability of attorneys and, potentially, lower costs and increase access to justice for those unable to secure representation. But it’s not clear that’s been the effect, at least not yet. Certainly, in 2020, we saw a surge in passers. But this year yielded 5568 attorneys between the February and July 2021 bar exams, across all law schools, the general bar exam and the attorneys exam, you name it. That’s down from 6906 last year, and it’s even below the 5825 in 2019.

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I want to be careful here. It’s of course not all the bar exam. The economy of California, the legal market of California, cost of living concerns—there are many reasons why attorneys might be inclined to take the bar exam elsewhere. Additionally, it’s not clear how many attorneys who took the bar exam in 2020 did so to take a secondary bar (e.g., to be admitted in a state outside of the state where they primarily practice) out of convenience.

In short, there are many reasons why the legal market in California may behave outside of the bar exam. And undoubtedly, the surge in passers in 2020 is great news for law schools, for students facing debt and the delayed practice of law, for those who would ultimately pass but now are admitted on the first attempt and need not spend more time studying, and so on. Many of those who would have been admitted in 2021 on a repeat are put into the 2020 first-time bucket, essentially an acceleration of admitting attorneys that will work its way out through fewer repeaters passing later.

But it’s worth watching to see whether there’s a demonstrable increase in licensed and practicing attorneys in the state of California after the lowering of the cut score. On that, we’ll have to wait and see.

Ranking the most liberal and conservative law firms among the top 140, 2021 edition

One of my most popular posts remains “Ranking the most liberal and conservative law firms.” That post is from 2013, and an update is long overdue.

At the outset, “ranking” a firm or calling it “conservative” or “liberal” is imperfect, I know, but I picked a title eight years ago and I’m sticking with it…. Better to call it, “which law firms contribute the most to Democrats or Republicans.” But I am updating the methodology, and I look forward to doing some even more interesting things with the data in the short term.

First, I looked at 140 law firms. I broke them out into two groups. The first are the AmLaw 100. The second are a group of 40 firms that fit the NLJ500 or Legal 500 plaintiffs’ firms. (Two firms appear in both lists, Paul Weiss and Quinn Emanuel.)

Second, unlike my 2013 ranking (where I looked at contributions to Barack Obama’s or Mitt Romney’s presidential campaigns), I expanded the window. This time, I focused on contributions to the Joe Biden campaign (including “victory fund) and the Donald Trump campaign (including “victory fund” and “Make America Great Again Committee”); the major party organizations (DCCC, DSCC, DNC, NRCC, NRSC, and RNC); and two major aggregators of campaign contributions, ActBlue (Democratic) and WinRed (Republican). There’s a little asymmetry here—Trump had four years of campaigning to Biden’s shorter window, ActBlue is more established than WinRed, etc.—but I think it evens out. These accounted for about 1/3 of all campaign contributions. (Future research will look at more.) I looked at the 2017-2020 period, a four-year window.

Third, I did not look at just attorney contributions, but I looked at any contributions from those employed by these firms. (See update below.) There are often different titles for attorneys (partner, counsel, summer associate, etc.) that are self-reported and are tougher to capture. And I thought it would be useful to include all contributions, even from consultants, paralegals, administrative assistants, and others employed by the firm for a broader portrait of the firm. Again, a judgment call here. I also looked for common misspellings, abbreviations, or alternative names for the firm (e.g., separating out the two Steptoe & Johnsons, etc.) to capture the most contributions.

So, that said, I’m sure there are errors in the data, but it’s a fairly good snapshot.

All told, I captured about $61 million in contributions to Democratic-affiliated groups compared to about $11 million for Republican-affiliated groups in 2017-2020, nearly a 6-to-1 ratio. (See update below.)

Below is a visualization of the AmLaw100 law firms. (By “percentage of contributions,” I mean by dollar figures, not individual instances.)

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Many firms had fewer than 10% of contributions go to major Republican outlets. A handful had at least 25%, and just three crossed 50%. Even among those the figures are deceptive. At White & Case, for instance, there was a single $500,000 contribution to the Trump Victory Fund, more than half of all Republican contributions in this four-year time period.

The 40 plaintiffs’ firms results are below (asterisks denote the second listing):

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Nine of these firms had $0 in contributions to major Republican outlets in this four-year period; another 6 had less than $100. And while some firms’ contributions were relatively modest (Bernstein, for instance, logged less than $1000 in total giving to these outlets, another deceptive way of looking at this data), others had contributions in the high six figures. Two firms, however, skewed toward Republicans.

Among the ten firms that gave the most money in raw dollars to Democratic outlets (see update below):

Paul Weiss $2,084,171

Latham $1,877,357

Kirkland $1,820,246

Covington $1,794,277

Sullivan & Cromwell $1,579,112

Wilmer $1,424,903

Sidley $1,416,481

Morgan Lewis $1,352,160

Skadden $1,310,634

Boies Schiller $1,080,094

And among the ten firms that gave the most money in raw dollars to Republican outlets (note, of course, duplicates among the largest law firms, and the caveat for White & Case!):

White & Case $966,401

Kirkland $822,685

Proskauer $697,230

Gibson Dunn $468,283

McGuireWoods $383,280

Paul Weiss $353,148

Akin Gump $343,102

Womble Bond $330,725

Holland & Knight $297,266

Kasowitz Benson $291,990

Below is a table with all 138 firms (excluding the pair of duplicate listings), sorted by percentage of contributions to Democratic outlets. As I mentioned, there’s more to come in the months ahead—this is my first cut at many ways of slicing this data.

Firm	D	R	D%
Berger Montague	$563,692	$0	100.0%
Grant & Eisenhoffer	$379,781	$0	100.0%
Kaplan Fox	$77,572	$0	100.0%
Hagens Berman	$71,775	$0	100.0%
Hausfeld	$35,142	$0	100.0%
Berman Tabacco	$21,182	$0	100.0%
Joseph Saveri Law	$6,284	$0	100.0%
MoginRubin LLP	$5,231	$0	100.0%
Bernstein Liebhard	$635	$0	100.0%
Lief Cabraser	$764,357	$30	100.0%
Herman, Herman	$284,946	$15	100.0%
Bernstein Litowitz	$205,015	$15	100.0%
Simons Hanley Conroy	$424,296	$50	100.0%
Baron & Budd	$472,147	$95	100.0%
Kessler Topaz	$200,699	$55	100.0%
Cohen Milstein	$294,106	$135	100.0%
Susman Godfrey	$489,486	$500	99.9%
Seeger Weiss	$131,268	$230	99.8%
Boies Schiller	$1,080,094	$2,045	99.8%
Burg Simpson Eldredge	$103,696	$262	99.7%
Fenwick	$849,559	$2,970	99.7%
Seledny & Gay	$68,150	$305	99.6%
Levin Papantonio	$32,177	$151	99.5%
Beasley, Allen, Crow	$123,253	$585	99.5%
Zelle	$28,104	$162	99.4%
Labaton Sucharow	$82,877	$546	99.3%
Kramer Levin	$384,389	$2,845	99.3%
O'Melveny	$948,486	$8,382	99.1%
Perkins Coie	$964,601	$10,769	98.9%
Dicello Levitt	$8,632	$100	98.9%
Morgan & Morgan	$290,895	$3,555	98.8%
Shearman & Stearling	$332,843	$5,047	98.5%
Pomerantz	$19,756	$300	98.5%
Weitz Luxenberg	$139,621	$2,245	98.4%
Schulte Roth	$361,008	$6,081	98.3%
Debevoise	$688,869	$11,802	98.3%
Covington	$1,794,277	$33,529	98.2%
Robbins Geller	$220,058	$4,157	98.1%
Reed Smith	$536,807	$10,284	98.1%
Cleary Gottlieb	$715,532	$15,909	97.8%
Jenner & Block	$456,977	$11,051	97.6%
Crowell & Moring	$448,249	$10,893	97.6%
Arnold & Porter	$1,010,582	$27,555	97.3%
Morrison & Foerster	$686,565	$20,164	97.1%
Gibbs Bruns	$34,679	$1,200	96.7%
Goodwin Procter	$633,974	$22,821	96.5%
McDermott	$645,730	$24,701	96.3%
Fried Frank	$343,140	$13,632	96.2%
Motley Rice	$204,325	$8,147	96.2%
Orrick	$512,834	$21,077	96.1%
Wachtell	$781,376	$33,328	95.9%
Squire Patton	$452,120	$19,432	95.9%
Milbank	$226,005	$9,768	95.9%
Ballard Spahr	$466,882	$20,190	95.9%
Napoli Shkolnik	$14,702	$706	95.4%
Willkie	$382,835	$19,520	95.1%
Robins Kaplan	$119,526	$6,498	94.8%
Cooley	$666,688	$36,707	94.8%
Skadden	$1,310,634	$80,853	94.2%
Jackson Lewis	$168,690	$11,035	93.9%
Morgan Lewis	$1,352,160	$88,704	93.8%
Wilson Sonsini	$419,257	$28,105	93.7%
Mintz Levin	$161,211	$10,974	93.6%
Davis Wright	$400,839	$27,564	93.6%
Latham	$1,877,357	$135,776	93.3%
Wilmer	$1,424,903	$104,317	93.2%
MoloLamken	$22,682	$1,687	93.1%
Weil	$304,943	$22,734	93.1%
Loeb & Loeb	$253,448	$19,305	92.9%
Venable	$515,986	$40,034	92.8%
DLA Piper	$1,023,423	$80,517	92.7%
Fragomen	$147,320	$11,746	92.6%
Cahill	$260,935	$24,916	91.3%
Ropes & Gray	$524,768	$51,262	91.1%
Bryan Cave	$466,366	$48,313	90.6%
Kilpatrick Townsend	$188,884	$19,787	90.5%
Simpson Thacher	$531,328	$55,795	90.5%
Faegre Drinker	$165,891	$17,446	90.5%
Troutman Pepper	$411,574	$43,744	90.4%
Cozen O'Connor	$450,877	$50,052	90.0%
Blank Rome	$419,866	$47,306	89.9%
Haynes and Boone	$187,019	$21,364	89.7%
Paul Hastings	$651,679	$80,412	89.0%
Seyfarth	$316,918	$41,631	88.4%
Steptoe	$444,029	$58,651	88.3%
Sidley	$1,416,481	$188,789	88.2%
Sullivan & Cromwell	$1,579,112	$213,897	88.1%
Dorsey	$236,890	$32,327	88.0%
Quinn Emanuel	$706,382	$104,250	87.1%
Hogan Lovells	$720,025	$110,101	86.7%
Nixon Peabody	$279,456	$42,747	86.7%
Norton Rose	$240,355	$36,880	86.7%
Paul Weiss	$2,084,171	$353,148	85.5%
McKool Smith	$95,052	$16,652	85.1%
Nelson Mullins	$317,407	$57,335	84.7%
Cadwalader	$147,453	$26,716	84.7%
Olgetree Deakins	$156,117	$29,215	84.2%
Greenberg Traurig	$774,034	$144,995	84.2%
Baker McKenzie	$278,722	$57,845	82.8%
Polsinelli	$194,899	$40,510	82.8%
Jones Day	$825,506	$180,284	82.1%
King & Spalding	$831,622	$182,858	82.0%
Duane Morris	$351,147	$81,164	81.2%
Littler	$283,479	$66,001	81.1%
Fox Rothschild	$207,568	$48,615	81.0%
Davis Polk	$580,987	$144,977	80.0%
Katten	$235,807	$59,367	79.9%
Mayer Brown	$584,028	$149,546	79.6%
Sheppard Mullin	$292,187	$76,171	79.3%
Locke Lord	$131,402	$37,901	77.6%
Lewis Brisbois	$149,093	$44,052	77.2%
Cravath	$347,924	$103,555	77.1%
Pillsbury	$321,200	$99,733	76.3%
Akin Gump	$1,064,087	$343,102	75.6%
Dechert	$359,039	$118,551	75.2%
Baker Botts	$203,823	$67,908	75.0%
Akerman	$336,528	$116,927	74.2%
Husch Blackwell	$169,494	$60,715	73.6%
Foley & Lardner	$224,329	$82,964	73.0%
Winston & Strawn	$575,472	$242,797	70.3%
Kirkland	$1,820,246	$822,685	68.9%
Vinson & Elkins	$213,491	$97,663	68.6%
Alston & Bird	$22,338	$10,362	68.3%
Baker Donelson	$169,876	$80,649	67.8%
Gibson Dunn	$933,762	$468,283	66.6%
Baker & Hostetler	$187,262	$105,942	63.9%
Gordon Rees	$89,923	$51,160	63.7%
Holland & Knight	$467,830	$297,266	61.1%
K&L Gates	$387,345	$254,137	60.4%
Fish	$122,748	$85,136	59.0%
Womble Bond	$408,260	$330,725	55.2%
Hunton Andrews	$170,952	$143,421	54.4%
Barnes & Thornburg	$219,289	$189,661	53.6%
McGuireWoods	$295,863	$383,280	43.6%
Proskauer	$417,600	$697,230	37.5%
White & Case	$493,656	$966,401	33.8%
Kasowitz Benson	$129,835	$291,990	30.8%
The Lanier Law Firm	$51,399	$269,337	16.0%

UPDATE 11/8: Some have asked about whether it makes sense to include all contributors, regardless of job title, into this framework. As I mentioned, attorneys use a variety of titles, and others are ambiguous (e.g., “consultant”). I ran tests at a few of the larger law firms, and I looked at only those who unambiguously identified themselves in some attorney capacity. At these firms, they are 97.5% to 98% of the dollars given. It does not strike me that at many firms—if any—it would materially change the allocation if I did another refinement to include only those who unambiguously identified themselves in some attorney capacity.

UPDATE 11/11: Due to a data entry error, some Perkins Coie contributions were double-counted, which led to an inflated count. The data has been corrected.