The very speedy timing of congressional election contests in Iowa

Last month I highlighted the path forward in Iowa’s Second Congressional District race. After the unofficial Election Day tally ended at a 47-vote margin for Mariannette Miller-Meeks over Rita Hart, Ms. Hart requested a recount. The recount narrowed the margin to just six votes, a margin that the state will likely ratify today. Ms. Hart may well file an election contest.

While one might be inclined to think that such disputes could languish for months, as the 2008 Coleman-Franken Senate contest in Minnesota lasted for several months deep into 2009, that’s not the case under Iowa law. An election contest will wrap up by December 8.

The contest court is created under Iowa Code § 60.1:

The court for the trial of contested elections for presidential electors or for the office of senator or representative in Congress shall consist of the chief justice of the supreme court, who shall be presiding judge of the court, and four judges of the district court to be selected by the supreme court, two of whom, with the chief justice, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of the court.

The rules are open-ended, and the timing is very fast under § 60.5:

The clerk of the court shall, immediately after the filing of the statement, notify the judges herein named, and fix a day for the organization of the court within two days thereafter, and also notify the parties to the contest. The judges shall meet on the day fixed, and organize the court, and make and announce such rules for the trial of the case as they shall think necessary for the protection of the rights of each party and a just and speedy trial of the case, and commence the trial of the case as early as practicable thereafter, and so arrange for and conduct the trial that a final determination of the same and judgment shall be rendered at least six days before the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following.

Note that the rules are “as they shall think necessary for the protection of the rights of each party and a just and speedy trial of the case.” Flexible, to be sure.

But why so fast? Why does the Code urge resolution by December 8 when the complaint in the contest could only be filed after state certification, November 30?

Well, in presidential election disputes, the “safe harbor” under 3 U.S.C. § 5 is six days before “the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following,” the date set by Congress for presidential electors to meet and vote.

Iowa Code links presidential election contests with other federal office contests. But the timeline is the same.

Before 1970, Iowa didn’t even have a congressional election contest procedure. Contests after a recount would be left to Congress. But in 1970, the state legislature added a provision to the code to allow for congressional election contests in the same fashion as presidential election contests. (Now-Senator Chuck Grassley was among those voting for this bill in the Iowa legislature!)

And in Iowa, “[t]he right to contest an election is only conferred by statute,” as the late Chief Justice Mark Cady once wrote, such that “contestants must strictly comply,” and “contestants are limited to the scheme provided by the legislature.”

While one might think that presidential election contests ought to operate differently from congressional election contests, it’s up to a state to decide how contests should proceed. And Deschler’s Precedents require exhaustion of state legal remedies before raising a challenge in the House of Representatives.

Then again, maybe there are good reasons to link the timing. It requires expeditious solutions to ensure that Iowa’s congressional delegation is fully represented (unlike Minnesota’s extensive vacancy). It guarantees members of Congress will have certification to present when the new Congress is seated January 3, even if there might be an election contest. And those members of Congress get to participate in the counting of electoral votes January 6, too.

Under the contest timing that the Iowa legislature has expressly provided, the contest period is very speedy—and in the event a contest is filed, the court must give a resolution by December 8.

Congress would stop the most rogue Electoral College scenarios in their tracks

I wanted to take a moment to point that, even under the most hardball of constitutional hardball scenarios, without suggesting anything about the legality of those other steps in the process, Congress would stop the most “rogue” Electoral College scenarios by January 6 and ensure that Joe Biden was named the next president.

Suppose some number of Republican-controlled state legislatures attempted to choose slates of electors to support Donald Trump that conflicted with the electors confirmed by the state’s election official as being won by Mr. Biden.

Suppose two slates of electoral votes were sent to Congress.

Suppose enough states did this to plausibly give Mr. Trump at least 270 electoral votes and Mr. Biden at least 270 electoral votes, counting all duplicates.

Suppose Vice President Mike Pence, presiding over the meeting on January 6, opted to read aloud from the slate of Republican electors.

(Each of these supposes comes with major legal questions and caveats, as I mentioned in the opening, but let’s just stipulate to all of them now.)

Immediately, I anticipate, at least one Democrat from each house would object, in writing. They would request that the Democratic slate of electors be counted in lieu of the Republican slate.

Each house would go to their separate chambers to vote.

The House, narrowly controlled by Democrats as of January 6, would assuredly vote to grant that objection.

The Senate would have at least 48 Democrats. To get to 51 (with a small caveat about whether the Senate would have 99 or 100 members after the new session began January 3 and the Georgia Senate runoff was held on January 5), Democrats would need just three Republicans to join them.

Four Senators—Senators Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, Mitt Romney, and Ben Sasse—have already congratulated President-Elect Joe Biden on his victory. At least three would likely join the 48 Democrats.

It is my sense, then, that even under this most egregious of rogue electoral vote scenarios that the Senate would join the House’s objection and insist on counting the Democratic slate instead of the Republican slate.

This, of course, might all change. And states might still try, regardless of the caveats above. But as I game out scenarios ahead of January 6, I do not see the most rogue Electoral College scenarios playing out in Mr. Trump’s favor.

Recounts and contests--a look ahead in the 2020 Iowa Second Congressional District election

Iowa’s Second Congressional District election is a close one. Shortly after Election Day, Republican candidate Mariannette Miller-Meeks appeared to hold a 282-vote lead over Democratic candidate Rita Hart, heading into a recount. A “clerical error” in Jasper County altered these totals to show Ms. Hart up by 162. That led to a recount in Jasper County and a hand recount in one precinct. Lucas County added a batch of votes that pushed the race back in favor of Ms. Miller-Meeks by 34 votes as of 8 am November 10. (Latest results here.) That’s less than one-hundredth of one percent separating the candidates, and about twenty times the write-in vote total. Those vote totals could still change today as counties finalize the canvass today (Iowa Code § 50.24). Among nearly 400,000 votes cast, it’s an extremely narrow margin.

What’s next? (For all references to the Iowa Code, see here.)

Recount: Candidates may request recounts of particular precincts or counties by the end of the week (Iowa Code § 50.48(1)). Recount boards are to be assembled and begin their work by November 17 (§ 50.48(3)). Recounts are to be completed by November 28 (§ 50.48(4)(c)) so that certification can happen by November 30 (§ 50.38).

Unfortunately, Iowa does not have an automatic recount provision in close races. It also does not automatically require that the entire district be recounted—something, I think, that’s a concern after Bush v. Gore, which expressed concern that different treatment of recount procedures across counties in a statewide election violated equal protection. (Professor Michael Morley has some thoughts about how lower courts have construed the scope of Bush v. Gore here.) But those are for another day, and a legislative solution, perhaps.

It’s not clear whether a recount would change much at all. The Jasper County recount netted Ms. Hart two votes; the subsequent manual recount in one precinct netted Ms. Miller-Meeks one vote. (Optical scan systems are quite good!)

It’s also not clear whether there are many absentee or provisional ballots for the candidates to challenge beyond the recount (which extends only to “ballots which were voted and counted for the office in question”). Iowa has a generous absentee ballot laws, which results in few being rejected; and it has very few provisional ballots given same-day registration and a fairly generous voter identification law that allows for “attesters” in lieu of identification. I haven’t seen public figures about these ballots, but if they’re not counted, they aren’t part of the recount under § 50.48(4)(a).

Contest in Iowa: If a candidate is disappointed with the results of the recount, she may file a contest within two days of the final statewide returns. The “contest court” consists of a five-member ad hoc tribunal: “the chief justice of the supreme court, who shall be presiding judge of the court, and four judges of the district court to be selected by the supreme court.” (§ 60.1) This contest court shall “make and announce such rules for the trial of the case as they shall think necessary for the protection fo the rights of each party and a just and speedy trial of the case.” (§ 60.5.) (Not exactly a lot of guidance.) The objective is to complete judgment by December 8. (This meets the federal “safe harbor” for presidential election disputes, but this provision of the contest rules applies to both presidential and congressional election contests.)

Contest in Congress: There’s one more place for the losing candidate to go—Congress. Congress has the power to judge the elections and returns of its members. Such contests are rare, but they do happen, like out of Florida’s Thirteenth Congressional District in 2006 (which was dismissed). That would be the last stop for January 3, 2021, when the new Congress is seated.

I don’t know what will happen as the last votes come in and as recount challenges proceed, but I’m anticipating the every potential step in the road given how exceedingly close the election has been and how dynamic the counting has proceeded.

No "folly," no "Potemkin Villages," no "wildfires"--a semester of in-person hybrid legal education

I’m wrapping up the last days of my in-person hybrid semester of law school teaching. I wanted to revisit some of the more dire claims made this summer.

Professor Dan Rodriguez described the plans as “nonsense,” “hubris,” and “folly.” He cites Professor Deborah Merritt who described plans to return to the university as “the Ptolemaic model of the universe.” Professor Tim Duane analogized the return to in-person education as “a large, dry forest after a devastating drought: a single spark or flying ember will readily spread a wildfire through this unburned woodland.” Professor Josh Blackman described them as “little more than Potemkin Villages,” anticipating that schools would “shift everything online” and face RICO actions from students.

It’s increasingly apparent these projections just weren’t true.

I taught one week in person, one week online to minimize first-year and upper-division student overlap in the building, and to use classroom space effectively. Some students opted for all online classes, as did some professors. All were accommodated.

I taught with a mask, and while students were spread around the room, the classroom environment was otherwise entirely ordinary.

I taught the end of the Spring 2020 term online, and I taught summer classes online, so I was eager to return to the classroom.

I didn’t realize how much I missed it. There’s a spontaneity that happens in the classroom, from student chatter among themselves to brief conversations before and after class. There’s a responsiveness and reaction to one another that’s missing from an online environment. I find the energy of moving about the room and using the chalkboard much better. I engage students in conversation more easily and readily than online, when I’m too easily tempted to shift into lecturing. It also meant that the relationships in the classroom more naturally translated to the online component in the other weeks.

Revisiting my August 2020 post on the topic, my reformatting worked (I think), and I was, indeed, cautious but eager. And I look forward to replicating it again this spring.

I close by noting that there were lots of nay-sayers (I highlight some above) last summer. Nay-saying would be an easily solution, to be sure. Online-only has attracted a lot of students, faculty, and institutions, and many seem to enjoy it reasonably well, or well enough, or well enough for Covid.

But, I think, it’s encouraging that in-person hybrid models were not as disastrous as others projected. There remains plenty of opportunity to think, based on an individualized institutional assessment, which models are best for which sets of students. I don’t think it’s a one-size-fits-all model. And I’m glad this in-person hybrid version of the model worked this fall.

No, the Electoral College will not give the presidency to Donald Trump

On November 13, 2016, I wrote a post entitled, “No, the Electoral College will not give the presidency to Hillary Clinton.” Supporters of Mrs. Clinton, heartbroken at her loss and in denial that Donald Trump could be the next president, plotted an ultimately-unsuccessful attempt for “faithless” electors to cast their votes for someone other than Mr. Trump.

I might as well update the post four years later with the same thing, because it feels like déjà vu, with some updates to what I wrote.

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There is a nascent but rapidly growing effort from supporters of Mr. Trump to persuade presidential electors who would otherwise support Joe Biden to cast votes for Mr. Trump instead when the Electoral College meets December 14. Absent an extraordinary change of circumstances, it simply won't happen. Mr. Biden will win a majority of electoral votes on December 14 and ultimately become the 46th president of the United States.

It's worth noting that a lot of options to affect the presidential outcome have long since passed--usually, waiting until after the election is not a good idea to affect an election.

State legislatures could choose their own electors instead of leaving the matter to a popular vote; but after those states chose to a popular vote November 3, that strategy is not an option.

Parties could also select electors inclined to support their preferred candidate even if not formally the party’s nominee. The electors, however, have already been selected. (Indeed, parties have become more cautious about how they choose presidential electors, as I anticipated would happen in 2016. That further reduces the likelihood of any “faithless” electors.)

Instead, the only strategy for Mr. Trump’s supporters (as legal challenges and recount opportunities look increasingly unlikely to alter the results) is to turn to the Electoral College itself and persuade electors to be "faithless"--that is, persuade them to vote not for Mr. Biden, to whom they pledged (formally or informally) their support, but Mr. Trump.

First, it's worth noting that these are loyal Democrats who were selected as Biden electors. Many of them are loyal Biden supporters on top of that. The list of viable options, then, is limited to those who oppose Mr. Biden--and not just oppose him, but affirmatively prefer Mr. Trump (more on that point below), because the act of being “faithless” is an act, essentially, of support for the runner-up. And this after Mr. Biden has won the election (at least, by all popular reports). It might be that Mr. Biden is not overly popular with some in the Democratic Party. But convincing these electors now to vote for someone else seems impossible.

Furthermore, these are electors in states that cast a plurality of their votes for Mr. Biden. Going to them and telling them to ignore the wishes of the voters in their own state for the wishes of Trump supporters is even more unlikely.

Second, the electors might need to flip to Mr. Trump, and not simply refuse to vote for Mr. Biden. In order for a candidate to win, he must secure 270 electoral votes. If he fails to do so, the race is thrown to the House of Representatives, where each state receives one vote, and a majority of the states (26) is required to secure the presidency. Even if enough Biden electors threw all their votes to, say, John Kasich, no one would have a majority, and the election would go to the House. While Democrats look to maintain control of the House, Republicans look to hold 26 state delegations (i.e., the majority), with perhaps 27 or 28. It’s true that the House could then vote for Mr. Trump on the heels of these faithless electors, but it remains a possibility that some Republicans in the House would be unwilling to do so.

It’s worth add that in the last 100 years or so, exactly zero “faithless” electors have “flipped” their support from the presumptive winner to the runner up.

Third, the margin of victory is onerous for Mr. Trump’s supporters. It appears Mr. Biden has won at least 290 electoral votes, meaning 21 electors would need to switch to Mr. Trump to deny Mr. Biden a majority, 22 electors to give Mr. Trump a majority, and 23 or 24 electors to account for Mr. Trump’s own possible "faithless" electors. Mr. Biden’s totals may well reach 306 electoral votes, meaning the numbers increase to 37, 38, and 39 or 40. (One can quibble over the numbers, of course. If Arizona swings back in Mr. Trump’s favor, perhaps it’s 295 for Mr. Biden. But these figures are all substantially over 270, and each vote margin becomes more difficult to overcome.)

These are Herculean numbers under almost any scenario. Consider that in the last 100 years (before 2016), just nine (depending on your math) electors have been "faithless" and voted for someone other than the person pledged to support. Granted, no such concerted effort has been made to change electors' minds. Robert M. Alexander has surveyed presidential electors and discovered that serious lobbying efforts have occurred before, and that about 10% of electors in previous elections have considered voting for someone else--but did not do so.

After the 2016 election, seven electors cast faithless votes. But five of those were supporters of Mrs. Clinton, the runner-up. Just two faithless electors cast votes against Mr. Trump—and neither threw their support behind Mrs. Clinton.

Fourth, several states bind their electors to the individuals they are pledged to support. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiafalo, and since states like Washington and Iowa have tightened their faithless elector laws in the last four years, It would either limit the pool of possible electors who could change their minds or stir litigation, possibly in multiple states, that would inspire even greater complexity, particularly if Congress is faced with multiple slates of electors.

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In short, there is no realistic chance that the Electoral College will change the result of this election. This is different than saying it is not legally possible; as I've noted and defended repeatedly, electors are permitted to vote for whomever they desire—it is that there is essentially no likelihood enough of the would do so in such a way to change the outcome of the election. Circumstances change, of course, and something might still inspire a significant number of electors to change their minds and vote for someone else. But the odds are low. And we have fairly settled expectations that our electors will not be "faithless," something unlikely to change in the weeks ahead.

A far different look between pre-Election Day and post-Election Day legal disputes

The hundreds of pre-Election Day disputes, many of which were initiated or pursued by the major political parties and their presidential candidates, were all over the map in their approaches, from disputing eligibility of candidates to appear on the ballot to disputing implementation of certain kinds of voting procedures.

But the challenges after Election Day look very different and are much narrower for a variety of reasons.

First, of course, is the margin. If a candidate wins by a wide margin in a state, there’s futility in the challenge (or less value in the challenge if you’re the winning candidate!). That sharply narrows the places for disputes.

Second is looking at the types of legal challenges to ballots. And this is because once you’ve scrambled the egg, it’s impossible to unscramble. That is, once ballots have been cast, commingled, and counted, it’s impossible to figure out which ballots should be excluded.

That’s also due in part to a reliance interest—that is, if voters entered the polling place on Election Day expecting the rules to look one way, then all their votes should be counted together.

Now, there are some batches of ballots that might be in dispute—subject, of course, to the first caveat of margin. Those include:

Provisional ballots, those cast that have some defect like a lack of identification or sufficient proof of residence. They might be cured in some limited period of time after Election Day, or they might be counted if some contingent event happens (e.g., if someone requested an absentee ballot but failed to surrender it at the polls, a state might count the provisional ballot if that absentee ballot never arrives to be counted).

“Discovered ballots,” those “found” after Election Day—it might be negligence or error that failed to include a batch, or it might be claims of fraud. If those weren’t originally included in an original count, there might be disputes over whether they should be counted if there are chain of custody concerns.

Late-arriving ballots, those postmarked on or before Election Day but counted within a set period of time after Election Day. Some states authorize this by statute, others have had judicial decisions, consent decrees, or administrative rules extending the deadline.

A subset of late-arriving ballots are segregated ballots in states like Pennsylvania and Minnesota, already subject to judicial challenge as a kind of late-arriving ballot.

Rejected absentee ballots, due to, for instance, disputes about signature matches.

Ballots not recognized as votes, either by tabulation machines, or that were otherwise manually counted.

Physically damaged ballots that were duplicated by election officials—in some states, if a ballot is torn, smudged, or damaged in some other way, an election official might “duplicate” the ballot so it can be read by the machine.

UPDATE: Special thanks to Professor Michael Morley for supplementing these categories!

Much of these batches, including most provisional ballots and many late-arriving ballots, are mostly beyond material legal dispute. That is, they are authorized under state statute, and challenges about their application would apply only to narrow subsets of ballots.

Or, in recount, one could fight tooth and nail in manual tally about whether to count or exclude this ballot or that based on this marking or that. Again, it’s very piecemeal and narrow.

The most extreme outcome would be to invalidate an election because of uncertainty over the winner. But that extreme outcome comes usually from evidence of pervasive fraud or some systemic question about the election, which requires extensive evidence.

In short, once the egg is scrambled—once a bunch of ballots are commingled and counted under existing rules without a sound hook to challenge those decisions (or under lawsuits that refused to prohibit those decisions)—those ballots are pretty much locked in absent something pretty egregious like pervasive fraud or unusual recount procedures. (It might be that some machines were operating in error, too, but there are a thousand uncertainties….) As for the remaining batches of ballots, they are a fixed universe with fewer viable challenges and far fewer at a systemic level.

We’ll see what litigation (or threats of litigation!) look like in the days ahead, and what kinds of additional precision this quick blog post might have as potential challenges arise. But it’s a portrait of how significantly different these challenges might be—at least, challenges filed in court.

Quick roundup of the status of election-related ballot initiatives in 2020

I thought I’d quickly run through some (there are more, check out Ballotpedia!) of the election-related ballot initiatives and their status (subject, of course, to late-breaking changes in vote totals!).

National Popular Vote: Colorado voters had a chance to reject the state’s decision to join the the National Popular Vote Compact to potentially alter how the state awards its presidential electors, but it appears that Prop 113 is headed toward affirming that decision. (There are other challenges to the Compact, of course, but this was potentially a big barrier toward the NPV reaching its goal.)

Redistricting: Virginia’s Question 1 approved a redistricting commission consisting of a mix of legislative leaders and citizens with supermajority requirements within the commission to approve maps. Maps then would go to the General Assembly for an up-or-down vote.

Top-two and top-four primaries, and ranked choice voting: Alaska’s Measure 2 would offer several changes to elections, including replacing the traditional partisan primary with a “top-four” primary (the top four candidates in the primary proceed to the general election, regardless of party), and a ranked-choice voting system. That measure appears (very early!) headed toward defeat. Florida’s Amendment 3 would institute a “top-two” system, but it needed 60% approval to amend the Constitution, and appears, while receiving a majority of the vote, to be headed toward defeat. Masschusetts’s Question 2 on ranked-choice voting also looks like it’ll end up failing.

Voter eligibility: California has a pair of ballot initiatives that look to split. Prop 17 appears headed toward passing, restoring the right to vote to those who finished a prison term but are on parole. Prop 18, allowing 17-year-olds to vote in primary elections if they turn 18 in the general, appears headed toward defeat.

Do we "never know" who won on "Election Night"?

I appreciate the sentiment behind a lot of the media narrative over the last couple of weeks—and the much broader effort of the election law and political science communities long before that—about the lack of certainty that we may have on “Election Night.” That said, I do think there’s a risk of overstating the claim, or of conflating a few ways of thinking about the claim, which I wanted to parse out.

First, of course, formally, the election isn’t over until it’s over. But that’s actually very late, depending on your view of when it’s “over.” A presidential election isn’t really “over” until Congress counts the votes (this year, January 6); a congressional election isn’t really “over” until Congress seats that member (this year, January 3), as it has the authority to judge the elections and returns of its own members.

But stepping back a bit, a state “finalizes” a result when it certifies an election result, usually by a set deadline in late November, but it could be earlier in some states or stretch into December in others. That’s a pretty good deadline from the state’s view, at least, that the election is over.

Stepping back yet again, however, we do see states offering various stages of counting. Counties may canvass the results by mid-November, and that canvass is usually enough to trigger the opportunity for a recount. It’s pretty “final” for that reason—someone appears to have lost and has the right to challenge that result through a recount; or, the margin is so close an automatic recount is triggered.

And stepping back to Election Night itself, there’s a canvass that night that provides a pretty clear picture of the results. “Unofficial,” sure. But it’s also the foundation for the later canvasses.

Of course, media outlets can “project” a winner, regardless of how many votes are in or not. They’ve improved dramatically since 2000, when they had problems in Florida not just in the projection but in “calling” states before all the polls in the state had closed. Since then, they’ve been much more careful about projecting results and have become much more sophisticated in their modeling.

We also know that “conceding” an election is a legally meaningless act. Al Gore “conceded” in 2000 to George W. Bush, allowing Mr. Bush to claim victory, only to retract it later. Stacey Abrams still refuses to concede her 2018 Georgia gubernatorial loss, to no legal effect.

“Claiming victory” is legally meaningless, as, again, Mr. Bush experienced in 2000. That can even happen without official results—think about how both Pete Buttigieg and Bernie Sanders claimed victory after the 2016 Iowa caucuses, well before any “official” results were released.

Both, of course, conceding and claiming victory can have popular reactions or responses. And maybe two presidential candidates simultaneously claiming victory leads to greater public perception problems.

Now, of course, we have several complications about Election Night this year.

The first is the sheer volume of absentee and vote-by-mail ballots. While most jurisdictions will allow some pre-processing of those ballots to allow them to be counted quickly on Election Night, some (like Pennsylvania) won’t until later. That volume—coupled with perhaps distorted political preferences between those voting by mail and those voting in person Election Day—could undermine the certainty of an Election Night conclusion.

The second is the dramatic increase in jurisdictions accepting ballots received after Election Day as long as they are postmarked by Election Day (or, in Pennsylvania’s case, those without a postmark at all), and the longer period of time in many jurisdictions. With the increase in absentee voting (but, it appears many are submitting their ballots early!), we might see a larger wave of such ballots, which means we don’t even know how many ballots we have on Election Night. We might know the delta of how many ballots have not yet been returned, an idea about the maximum number of outstanding ballots. And depending on the contest, it might not be enough to matter much.

The third is an anticipation of post-Election Day litigation. If the claim is that there is increased election uncertainty because of litigation, it’s a reason to distrust even “unofficial” results Election Night. It’s particularly true in states like Pennsylvania and Minnesota with segregated ballots received after Election Day; or in any recount, contests and changes to vote totals can occur.

I’m somewhat concerned about “normalizing” these last two narratives. I don’t know it’s great to think about ballots trickling in several days after the election—I know that there are good reasons, especially for military and overseas voters, to have some late-arriving deadlines; and I accept that, in a pandemic, we may want some concessions due to high volume of mail. But I prefer some finality of ballots received by Election Day, in that we know what the vote totals are. And maybe that means some better and earlier voting opportunities to get those ballots out. I also don’t think it’s great to expect or anticipate litigation as something to change outcomes.

Finally, it’s worth noting that we do sometimes have lightning-fast certification. Consider Jason Smith of Missouri, who was sworn into Congress less than 18 hours after the polls closed in 2013. True, Missouri had an unusually fast certification window for special elections.

In short, I think a lot of the framing is right—we should not have an expectation of finality of an election on Election Night. That said, we’ll still know a lot about a lot of elections, including many if not most slates of presidential electors. But, I think it overstates that many times we know, in a less formal sense, about the winners; that this election does, admittedly, present some greater uncertainties; but, I hope, we can seek out greater certainty and finality closer to Election Night in future years. We should count all the votes, and we should know that takes time. But we should also know that we often “know” the winners relatively quickly.

Some scrutiny of the Iowa Supreme Court's dissenting opinion in LULAC v. Pate

The Iowa Supreme Court recently issued a 4-3 decision in LULAC v. Pate. It’s a robust discussion from a state court of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. And there are some weaknesses—particularly in the dissenting opinion—that I thought I’d spend a little time exploring.

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The Iowa legislature enacted an election statute earlier this year in light of the coronavirus pandemic. The statute made a calculated tradeoff to expand access to absentee ballots. First, it authorized county auditors to mail absentee ballot request forms to every voter. Second, it prohibited county auditors from pre-filling that information on the forms (the “front-end” process) or from correcting errors or omissions on submitted forms (the “back-end” process). While the legislature dramatically increased the number of absentee ballot request forms circulating in the state, it added modest fraud prevention measures to ensure only voters completed the information.

The Iowa Supreme Court, in a unanimous per curiam opinion (with one justice writing separately) in Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee v. Pate, concluded that Iowa’s law was permissible in that voters, not county auditors, were required to complete the absentee ballot request form—the front-end process. County auditors could not pre-populate the form and mail to prospective absentee voters for them simply to sign and return.

Then came litigation about the back-end process. If a voter fails to complete the form or has an error, county auditors have, in the past, corrected those omissions or errors by checking the information on a voter database and finishing the form for the voter. Now that there were far more absentee ballot request forms circulating, the legislature prohibited that practice. Instead, auditors must contact voters—say, by phone or by mail—to request the voters complete or correct the form. (Most common is the omission of an ID number, either a driver’s license number or a four-digit PIN on the voter ID card.) Some public interest groups sued.

The particular burden described here is worth noting. Absentee ballot requests must be submitted 10 days before Election Day. (In many states, absentee requests may be filed up until the day before the election—more on that in a moment.) That means there are at least 10 days (and, of course, more if the requests are submitted earlier) for auditors to process, to contact voters, and for voters to correct.

The matter was litigated in state court, but Iowa courts, apparently, have a “lock step” approach, which means they use federal cases to interpret similar state law provisions on voting rights. That involves relying upon the Anderson-Burdick framework.

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The framework. The majority writes, “The dissent confuses the burden on the voter with the potential burden on county auditors. Constitutional law is concerned only with the burden on the voter. The burden on the voter, as we have explained, is simply to fill out an absentee ballot request form correctly. f the voter fails to do that, they still have several fallbacks under the statute: (1) to respond to a county auditor’s follow-up communication, (2) to vote absentee in person, or (3) to vote on election day. Courts weigh burdens on voters against the state’s interests by looking at the whole electoral system.”

I’m not sure this is the most accurate way to separate burdens on voters—often, state rules (say, about absentee ballot signature matching, or about ballot access petition requirements on independent candidates) fall on non-voters who enforce it, but the consequence falls on voters. Nevertheless, the majority opinion is entirely right to focus on the totality of the election law system and its effect on prospective voters.

To frame the burden, as the majority articulates: “The plaintiffs here, in effect, seek to relieve that burden by having the auditor correct or provide the identification information. Instead, the law gives the applicant a second chance to fill out the application correctly by requiring the auditor to contact the applicant.”

As to the dissenting opinion, it’s worth framing the matter from Supreme Court precedent as Chief Justice Earl Warren did in McDonald v. Board of Elections (1969): “[T]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellants' ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote. It is thus not the right to vote that is at stake here, but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots. Despite appellants' claim to the contrary, the absentee statutes, which are designed to make voting more available to some groups who cannot easily get to the polls, do not themselves deny appellants the exercise of the franchise . . . .”

This might be a jarring statement to read from the Court that had, at that time, recently issued decisions in cases like Baker v. Carr, Reynolds v. Sims, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, and Williams v. Rhodes. But it’s reflective of the fact that the Court has viewed absentee voting as an accommodation of the state, not a “fundamental rights.” It’s a reason states have long had defined classes of voters who can or cannot secure absentee ballots and fewer (i.e., different) opportunities to cure erroneous ballots.

Now, the dissenting opinion does not cite McDonald. The dissenting opinion also does not engage the majority opinion’s reliance on a state case called Luse v. Wray (Iowa 1977), which also found that rules pertaining to absentee ballots ought to be given greater deference. Courts have occasionally grappled with how to handle McDonald in an Anderson-Burdick era, often either relying on the McDonald framework as good evidence that absentee ballots (indeed, in McDonald, the plaintiffs were entirely excluded from being able to secure ballots) are subject to light scrutiny from reviewing courts; or, courts have found that absentee ballots in a particular case heighten some class of voters unjustifiably to a higher burden.

Statements like this in the dissenting opinion, however, tend, I think, to undermine such precedents: “Having made absentee voting available to all Iowa voters thirty years ago, and now encouraging voters to utilize absentee voting as the ‘safest way to vote,’ the state has an obligation to ensure that method of voting is actually available to its citizens.” Worse, however, is this concern about whether absentee ballot is “actually available.” The absentee ballots are, of course, actually available. The conditions under which they are available, however, are simply subject to a statutory system in place. And the facts demonstrated that these ballots were, in fact, “actually available.”

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The facts. The dissenting opinion acknowledged that the evidentiary record indicates at present (that is, as of earlier this week, ahead of the October 24 ballot request deadline) that, “That the majority reads the Secretary of State’s absentee ballot statistics to show that most counties appear to currently be keeping up with getting absentee ballot requests out to voters does not minimize the burden identified in the record. Historically, over forty percent of voters in the general election request their absentee ballot in the last ten days prior to the deadline for requesting them; almost thirty percent in the final four days. The deluge is just getting started. Only time will tell if they will keep up.”

We have the benefit of a few days’ review, and we see that (1) there has not been a deluge of requests, and (2) county auditors have been keeping up. Recall, too, it’s much faster for absentee ballot requests because everyone received a form to request an absentee ballot early.

The majority and dissenting opinions disputes the evidence. The dissent largely relied on the expert evidence of a political scientists whose predictions the majority rejected as inconsistent with the existing evidence. But the majority rightly noted the limitations of the expert’s testimony, including crucial weaknesses in his framing.

We now know that the majority did, indeed, have the better of the argument. 842,459 absentee ballots had been requested as of October 20, four days before the deadline. The dissent projected 1.2 million absentee requests; in fact, the final tally was 915,711. The expert’s opinion, which the dissenting opinion relied upon, suggested 30% of absentee requests historically come in the last four days; but the majority noted that requests had been filed earlier this year and that requests were declining at a high rate entering the final days. In fact, only about 8% of requests came in the last four days.

It’s also worth emphasizing the errors of the dissenting opinion in aggregating the problem. In virtually all Iowa counties, there has been no difficulty returning absentee ballot requests. Instead, in two counties, Johnson and Woodbury, had previously violated state law under a unanimous recognition of the Iowa Supreme Court in submitting invalid absentee ballot requests to voters earlier in the election cycle. As the majority notes, “It’s not inconceivable the high proportion of unfulfilled requests in these two counties is due to issues associated with sending, and then needing to recall, thousands of prepopulated ballot request forms because they were issued unlawfully.”

This is the right, indeed, perhaps the only inference to draw from these facts. In 97 of 99 counties, about 1 in 1000 ballot requests had not yet been mailed out—for lack of completeness on the back end or for any other reason. It makes little sense that in these 2 counties, voters were somehow overwhelmingly unable to complete their absentee requests at the same rate of voters in Iowa’s other 99 counties (including populous ones like Linn and Polk). And even there, it remained true through those last four days of a “tsunami” of requests.

In short, there were several factual errors the dissenting opinion made, both in relying on weak expert testimony instead of existing actual facts subject to judicial notice, and in weak inferences from the existing factual record.

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The law. The dissenting opinion is also curious about how to examine the burdens on voters. Recall that a law prohibiting all county auditors from pre-filling out data would affect every absentee voter in the state. It would delay every absentee ballot form statewide, maybe by minutes or maybe by days as voters got around to completing the form (including the identification portions of the form). Yet the court unanimously accepted this burden as a legitimate given the trade-off of an expansive new opportunity to vote by mail.

The majority opinion rightly notes, “If every single front-end deficiency could be corrected in the back-end, the front-end would be meaningless.” That is, the security features put in place with the dramatically increased volume of absentee ballot applications mailed around—front-end completion of the form by voters and not auditors, back-end error correction of the form by voters and not auditors—work in tandem.

It’s clear, then, that the back-end law imposes “a different burden.” But it’s not clear why the dissent’s claim “because of the inherent delays it creates for a voter to receive an absentee ballot” makes that different burden more severe. It affects a much smaller set of voters, and it ignores the delays of the front-end process.

Still more curiously, the dissenting opinion notes that “county auditors use the I-Voters database to make corrections only when the application contains sufficient other identifying information to ensure it is the correct person.” Of course, the very problem that the majority identifies is to ensure that all the information is voter-provided, not simply some of it—”sufficient” is not left to the discretion of the county auditor, but to the legislature’s calculus.

But I want to return to an earlier point. Some states allow you to submit an absentee ballot request up until the day before Election Day. Iowa’s deadline is, in some respects, much more burdensome at 10 days. Yet, that includes opportunities to cure deficiencies in the absentee ballot applications—something that a one-day deadline likely precludes. And given how exceedingly few (again, in most counties, 1 in a 1000 as we approach the election) applications appear to have any material delays of all sorts, whether things auditors might have been able to cure or not, the greater framework was not a touchstone of the analysis.

Finally, back to the burden on voters. An erroneous absentee ballot form, as the majority notes, still provides three opportunities for voters: fix it; go vote early in person; go vote on Election Day. Yes, there is an ongoing pandemic (the dissenting opinion frames it glibly, “one might forget we’re even in the midst of a historic global pandemic”) But these careful steps taking by the state legislature, the secretary of state, county auditors, and local election officials administering in-person voting, coupled with extra opportunities for absentee voting, cannot be brushed aside with the word “pandemic” as a reason to alter the legal regime—absent, at least, some more specific burden relating to this particular issue. It may make absentee voting slightly more subject to delays for a vanishingly small number of voters. That, in my view, is not substantial burden to disrupt the statute—at least, not under the Anderson-Burdick framework.