Justice Kagan wrote on behalf of eight justices—not seven—in Chiafalo v. Washington

I’ve seen several versions of the claim that Justice Elena Kagan’s opinion in Chiafalo v. Washington was “on behalf of seven justices,” with Justice Clarence Thomas concurring in the judgment, joined in part by Justice Neil Gorsuch.

That’s not accurate. Justice Kagan’s opinion is on behalf of eight justices, all but Justice Thomas. This comes from the case syllabus:

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined as to Part II.

Admittedly, one’s eyes might glaze over the caption to see that Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined, and conclude that Justice Gorsuch did not join Justice Kagan’s opinion. But according to the case caption, he joined Justice Kagan’s opinion in full, and he joined part of Justice Thomas’s opinion.

This is a curious move, to say the least, and feels a little belt-and-suspenders for Justice Gorsuch. Justice Kagan’s opinion relies on states having power under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment, which “give[s] States broad power over electors.” Justice Thomas’s opinion relies on states having power under the Tenth Amendment: “When the Constitution is silent, authority resides with the States or the people. This allocation of power is both embodied in the structure of our Constitution and expressly required by the Tenth Amendment.” He continues, “Put simply, nothing in the text or structure of Article II and the Twelfth Amendment contradicts the fundamental distribution of power preserved by the Tenth Amendment.”

Justice Gorsuch didn’t join Justice Thomas’s part of the opinion describing Article II and the Twelfth Amendment as simply an obligation on the states rather than a source of power to the states. So he might agree that there’s power in Article II and the Twelfth Amendment, and he wants to emphasize the structural point of the Tenth Amendment.

But there might be another reason. Might. Justice Gorsuch might have sought to protect this line of Justice Thomas’s opinion from attack by Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, which did, after all, secure eight justices. Justice Kagan did attack Part I of Justice Thomas’s opinion, but she didn’t make any mention of the Tenth Amendment—and for that, Justice Gorsuch could join in full. Indeed, it might be a reason why Justice Gorsuch didn’t need to identify a separate endorsement for Justice Thomas’s position in Baca. It preserves a line of Tenth Amendment reasoning for future cases that hasn’t been expressly dismissed by a majority of the Court.

Maybe it’s too much speculation at this point. But the opening point of this post still remains—eight justices, not seven, joined in the principal opinion in Chiafalo.

 I revised the title because the post was confusing. My apologies!

A puzzle to consider in Colorado Department of State v. Baca

The two “faithless elector” cases were originally consolidated to be heard together. But Justice Sonia Sotomayor late in the process discovered she knew one of the parties in the Colorado case and withdrew. That may have been a fortuitous act and provided a clean opinion in Chiafalo v. Washington—and the per curiam opinion in Colorado Department of State v. Baca gives us a hint why.

Many have focused on the substantive difference between the Washington and Colorado laws—Washington counts a faithless vote but fines faithless electors; Colorado does not count a faithless vote and replaces a faithless elector.

But there were material procedural differences, too—specifically, multiple material problems with the Colorado plaintiffs’ case in Baca. In Washington, the electors were fined and contested that in state court. Easy injury to provide (a $1000 fine), easy remedy to seek, easy cause of action to raise.

In Colorado, however, plaintiffs faced several challenges. Were their claims moot? Could they sue a state under Section 1983—or, really, could the state waive this argument when sued for damages?

At oral argument in Baca, Justice Stephen Breyer in particular with concerned about these procedural wrinkles in the Colorado case. Justice Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch also raised versions of such concerns.

Now, because Justice Sotomayor was recused from Baca, the principal case became Chiafalo, because all nine justices could participate. Eight justices joined Justice Elena Kagan’s opinion; Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined in part.

Now, to the entirety of the Court’s per curiam opinion in Baca:

PER CURIAM.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed for the reasons stated in Chiafalo v. Washington, ante, p. ___.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR took no part in the decision of this case.

JUSTICE THOMAS concurs in the judgment for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in Chiafalo v. Washington, ante, p. ___.

I looked at this opinion a few times wondering what happened. Specifically, what happened to Justice Gorsuch? He agreed with Justice Thomas’s Tenth Amendment argument in Chiafalo. What about here? Is the Tenth Amendment no longer in play?

And then I considered another possibility—as a per curiam opinion, we don’t see the lineup of justices. Some justices may not agree with the outcome but may choose not to note their dissenting opinion. It might be the case that Justice Gorsuch (and perhaps another, like Justice Breyer) didn’t agree to reverse for the reasons stated in Chiafalo. It might be that the procedural wrinkles would have been a reason to reverse, but they opted not to publicize that here and now, saving the issue for another day.

I don’t know. I would, however, resist the urge to call Baca a “unanimous” decision of the Court. It certainly appears unanimous. But there are reasons to think that some of the procedural wrinkles would lead some members of the Court to come out differently if they couldn’t hide behind the per curiam opinion here.

Avoiding the temptation to overread Chiafalo v. Washington

I’ve taken a day to chew over the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiafalo v. Washington, the “faithless electors” case. I’ve read a lot of commentary and talked to a lot of people who’ve wondered about broader implications of this case. My reaction is: it might be best not to overread this case.

This is, in one sense, an extraordinary case, but in another, and perhaps more significant, sense, a narrow case. The case is really about one set of facts: the state power to penalize or replace electors who cast a vote contrary to statewide popular vote winner.

I think some of the Court’s language could plausibly be used in other contexts. For instance, when it talks about the “State’s popular vote,” could that preclude a pledge for the national popular vote winner? Maybe—but, then again, maybe because that’s the way states do it now, and that’s what Washington and Colorado do, so that’s the language used. When the Court says that the Equal Protection Clause binds legislative decisionmaking, does that mean the legislature no longer has the power to select electors itself? Maybe—but, then again, the Court elsewhere favorably cites the deferential approach in McPherson v. Blacker. Could Congress be bound by the Court’s reasoning? Maybe—but, then again, it favorably cited “Congress’s deference to a state decision” elsewhere.

In short, my instinct in a decision with an eight-justice majority is to closely heed the narrow holding—states, I think, are free to run with statutes that bind presidential electors—and to loosely consider the Court’s reasoning for later application. It might be persuasive to a five-justice majority considering a later issue, but it’s just as easily distinguishable for some of the reasons I identified. The context matters, and the context here—again, while extraordinary—is narrow. So, in short, the reasoning is as persuasive to later courts as later courts deem it—no more, no less, and, really, hardly binding. The “mays” are just mays, not musts.

That’s my sense of how to read this case, anyway.

Analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in the "faithless electors" cases

The Supreme Court has issued its decision in Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado Department of State v. Baca. The primary opinion in Chiafalo is here. A brief per curiam in Baca is here. Justice Elena Kagan wrote the principal opinion joined by all justices except Justice Clarence Thomas; Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch in part. The power of the state to regulate “faithless electors”—either fining them or replacing them—was affirmed.

In Chiafalo, three electors cast votes for Colin Powell for president and assorted candidates for vice president instead of Mrs. Clinton and Tim Kaine. Congress counted those votes for Mr. Powell. Those electors were each ultimately fined $1000.

In Baca, an elector who attempted to cast a vote for John Kasich for president instead of Hillary Clinton was deemed to have vacated his office. He was replaced, another elector voted for Mrs. Clinton, and that vote was counted in Congress. (Justice Sonia Sotomayor was recused from this case because she had a friendship with one of the parties.)

Justice Kagan’s opinion relies heavily in part on Ray v. Blair, the 1952 Supreme Court decision that permitted states to require a pledge to support the candidate, but it reserved on the enforceability of that pledge. The “longstanding practices” of electors weighed against the challengers in Ray v. Blair, and it’s the same here in Chiafalo. Justice Kagan’s opinion also relies on the NLRB v. Noel Canning decision (slip op. at 13) to emphasize longstanding practices.

Justice Kagan’s decision really relies on a phrase she notes on p.10 of the slip opinion, “The Constitution is barebones about electors.” This gives states broad power over electors.

Justice Kagan is less than impressed with the argument that “vote” or “ballot” necessarily implies choice. She explains, “But those words need not always connote independent choice. Suppose a person always votes in the way his spouse, or pastor, or union tells him to. We might question his judgment, but we would have no problem saying he 'votes' or fills in a 'ballot.'" (Slip op. at 11, with more onto 12.)

Justice Kagan also situated the Twelfth Amendment as an important qualification to the original understanding of the scope of elector discretion. She emphasized, “The Amendment thus advanced, rather than resisted, the practice that had arisen in the Nation’s first elections,” that is, party-line voting. (Slip op. at 14-15.)

Congressional deference matters some, but not the way the electors suggested: “Congress’s deference to a state decision to tolerate a faithless vote is no ground for rejecting a state decision to penalize one.” (Slip op. at 17.)

To my mind, of note includes footnote four, which provides, “And if a State adopts a condition on its appointments that effectively imposes new requirements on presidential candidates, the condition may conflict with the Presidential Qualifications Clause.” That’s a view suggested in Term Limits v. Thornton and which I get at in Weaponizing the Ballot, about whether states have the power to add qualifications to presidential candidates—yes, there’s a “may,” but the suggestion continues that states may not do so.

Footnote eight also concedes questions about how to handle candidates who die between Election Day and the meeting of the Electoral College. In my mind, there are interesting Twentieth Amendment questions in such circumstances, too, that may lessen the concern—but, as the Court notes, it’s not something for the Court to confront at this time.

Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined in part by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Thomas returned to his dissenting opinion in Term Limits v. Thornton (1995)—he views the Constitution’s elections clauses not as granting power to a state, but requiring states to perform a duty. He returned to a more vigorous view of the Tenth Amendment (this is the portion of the opinion Justice Gorsuch joined). The Constitution’s silence on the power to control electors should lean toward the state’s reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment to regulate them. His views didn’t carry the day, obviously, but they do get to the same place as the majority opinion.

In short, all nine justices agreed that states may fine faithless electors or replace them. I anticipate more states will enact statutes doing so just in the years ahead.

This post has been updated.

Related reading:

No, the Electoral College will not give the presidency to Hillary Clinton, Nov. 13, 2016

New effort (doomed to fail) calls for presidential electors to collectively exercise independent judgment, Dec. 6, 2016

The Electoral College won’t stop Trump—but it may change how political parties pick electors in 2020, Dec. 11, 2016

Faithless electors: Now it’s up to Congress, Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 2016

Status of 2016 faithless presidential elector litigation, Dec. 19, 2017

Washington State Supreme Court upholds finds for 2016 faithless electors, May 23, 2019

Analysis: 10th Circuit finds Colorado wrongly removed faithless presidential elector in 2016, Aug. 21, 2019

Why “faithless electors” have little power to change the winner of presidential elections, Oct. 14, 2019

Symposium: Leave courts out of presidential elector dispute, SCOTUSblog, Apr. 20, 2020

Brief of Professor Derek T. Muller as amicus curiae in support of neither party, Chiafalo v. Washington & Colorado Department of State v. Baca

Oral argument analysis: Will the Tenth Amendment make a comeback in the faithless electors cases?, May 13, 2020

Barriers facing a Kanye West 2020 presidential run

It’s hard to know how seriously to take a tweet from Kanye West. On July 4, he tweeted, “I am running for president of the United States!” Sadly, “journalists” from outlets like Reuters and ABC News chose not to investigate and simply engaged in the embarrassing contemporary practice of reciting a tweet as if it’s news, without, say, you know, engaging in journalism (e.g., investigating, interviewing relevant parties, reporting, etc.).

I doubt it’s serious, but for the good reason that even if it’s earnest, it’s still probably not serious. Ballot access remains a real issue for a presidential candidate at this late date. Mr. West would have two viable paths.

The first is to co-opt an existing political party’s presidential nomination. It seems unlikely the Democratic or Republican Parties would do so, nor the Libertarian Party, which formally has a nominee. Other parties like the Green Party, Constitution Party, or Reform Party are at various stages of their nominating process, and they’re unlikely to appear on the ballot in all fifty states and D.C. I suppose it’s possible, but this process seems unlikely.

The second is to run as an independent candidate. (A related path would be to establish a new political party, but this is more complicated and something I’ll dismiss for the moment.) This requires the Herculean effort of securing ballot access in all fifty states and D.C. One doesn’t need to get on the ballot everywhere to win the presidency—in theory, access in 270 electoral votes’ worth of states is enough. But, to be frank, there’s a material difference, in my view, between serious independent candidates like John Anderson in 1980 and Ross Perot in 1992, and unserious independent candidates like Lyndon LaRouche in several elections and Evan McMullin in 2016—breadth of a campaign to every (or nearly every) state lends seriousness to the ticket. And while write-in candidates should not be easily dismissed in local or even statewide elections, presidential candidates seem hard to take seriously.

(It’s worth noting that while I’ve seen the claim that Mr. West’s name could be written-in “anywhere,” that’s not true—at least, not written in and counted anywhere. Several states do not recognize write-in votes for the president, which the Supreme Court has acknowledged is legitimate if ballot access rules otherwise are not too onerous. Indeed, think how a presidential election works—one isn’t casting votes for the president, but for a slate of electors who’ll cast votes for that candidate when the Electoral College meets. A write-in campaign ought, I think, to require, at the very least, some pre-election filing of the slate of electors who’ll support that candidate, given that the ballots in most states don’t list the electors. And frankly, several states don’t have rules about even this while purporting to authorize write-in presidential votes.)

The ballot access deadline has (in theory—more on that in a moment) already passed in Texas, Indiana, Maine, New Mexico, New York, and North Carolina. Other ballot access deadlines arise in the next couple of weeks for some states. Off the top, Mr. West would be hard to take seriously, even if, today, he had amassed an army of signature-gatherers to canvass the remaining states (and challenges for signature-collection seem exacerbated during a pandemic). Some of these efforts seem tough at this stage—like Florida’s 132,000 signature requirement by July 15.

In theory, for two reasons. I borrow deadlines from Ballotpedia, and maybe they’re not all up to date. But that’s in part because many states have been pushing back their ballot access deadlines by legislative rule or executive order due to the coronavirus pandemic. Some have lowered signature requirements, and there have been rumbling about moving to online signatures in places. States like New York have shown willingness to be more generous. It’s possible, then, that pending or apparently-passed deadlines may not have yet actually passed.

Another is that Mr. West could litigate, a la John Anderson in 1980. Federal courts have been using flabby balancing tests to justify giving independent or minor party candidates additional opportunities to secure ballot access when the rules are too restrictive—and courts seem increasingly willing to do so during the coronavirus pandemic. Nevertheless, winning several kinds of challenges in different federal courts (absent Supreme Court intervention), all ahead of Election Day, seems not only to require extraordinary legal coordination and preparation (something a tweet on running a campaign seems to lack), but also extraordinary levels of success. UPDATE July 6: The Fourth Circuit has recently affirmed North Carolina’s exceedingly early March 3 independent presidential candidate petition deadline.

I’m sure some will speculate about which major party candidate Mr. West’s candidacy would most affect, whether his appearance on the ballot in certain states but not others might alter the Electoral College, and so on. My point is rather this—it’s hard to take a candidacy announced this late terribly seriously because, to be a serious candidate, one ought to appear on the bulk of ballots in the United States, and candidates announcing at this late date have little chance of doing so.

It’s also true, of course, that even an unserious candidate like Messrs. LaRouche and McMullin could disrupt a presidential election—playing a “spoiler” role in select states, and so on. That’s different than how I’m using the term “serious,” but, of course, I recognize that this may be the greater concern for many political watchers.

This post has been updated as new information arises.

UPDATE July 7: As of early July 7, there is no indication of any attempt by Mr. West to gather signatures in any states, which suggests, as this opening paragraph provided, that a tweet is not newsworthy.

UPDATE July 8: This free-wheeling interview at Forbes shows a couple of things. First, while he coins the name “Birthday Party,” his bid would assuredly be an independent one, and the “party” affiliation would be informal, at least for 2020. Second, Forbes reports, “For much of the phone calls, his core message, strategically, was that he has 30 days to make a final decision about running for president. At that point, he says, he’d miss the filing deadline for most states, though he believes an argument could be made to get onto any ballots he’s missed, citing coronavirus issues.” This reflects a seriousness I hadn’t anticipated—as I explained earlier, some ballot access deadlines might be feasible to make up given the coronavirus. But, 30 days as a “final decision” suggests that he’s not trying to get on the ballot today, which, as I noted in my July 7 update, seems strange and hard to justify. While coronavirus issues can help him make up some ground in some states, the more state deadlines slip away, the harder it is to meet them. Starting a run in early August—that is, starting signature-gathering then—would not be feasible.

UPDATE July 14: Ben Jacobs reports that there were some fits and starts of an attempt at ballot access in at least Florida and South Carolina, but it appears those have ended.

UPDATE July 15: Mr. West has filed an independent candidate statement in Oklahoma with a slate of electors.

Voting rights problems with the District of Columbia statehood bill

I’ve previously discussed the District of Columbia statehood bill, H.R. 51, and how, I think, D.C. statehood (or retrocession of D.C. to Maryland) should be contingent on a repeal of the Twenty-Third Amendment. The bill would carve out most of D.C. as a new state, but the remaining tiny enclave of federal buildings would remain, and that enclave would be entitled to three electoral votes.

One problem is a politically sticky first-mover question. If you condition statehood on repeal, a handful of states can effectively block statehood; if you grant statehood and hope for repeal, it may never happen.

I’ve tried to figure out what the remaining enclave looks like. The D.C. planning commission offers a sketch of that proposed residual district as of 2016. It mostly (but not entirely!) tracks with Census Tract 62.02, which, as of the 2010 census, had 33 inhabitants, and around 60 inhabitants as of 2018. This is imperfect, because it’s not entirely aligned with the census tract. And it doesn’t tell us how many are eligible voters. But it’s my start. And a 60-person jurisdiction receiving 3 electoral votes is, shall we say, suboptimal.

Under the Twenty-Third Amendment, Congress has power to choose how to award D.C.’s electors. So some have proposed interesting alternatives: give the votes to the winner of the Electoral College, or the winner of the national popular vote (if there’s such a thing). Another suggestion is that Congress doesn’t have to award them at all, which might lead to denominator problems in ascertaining a “majority” of the Electoral College. Now, the Twelfth Amendment says “majority of the whole number of electors appointed,” so perhaps those three aren’t counted as “appointed,” and we have (at least here) no problem.

But what Congress says it will do today isn’t necessarily what it’ll do tomorrow. There remains the possibility of Congress choosing three electors on its own, which seems to open up opportunities for mischief if we invite Congress to decide what to do with those electors. Since the Twenty-Third Amendment, Congress has assumed the people of D.C. vote for those electors. Shifting the power back to Congress invites a parliamentary-style choice. Only three electoral votes, but nevertheless congressional influence.

Section 206 of the bill anticipates this problem and provides for expedited repeal of the Amendment. But, there’s no guarantee that 2/3 of each house of Congress and 3/4 of the states would agree—or agree in time for a least one presidential election.

H.R. 51 also anticipates that there will be eligible voters remaining in the seat of government. Section 204 anticipates giving the remaining residents (33, 60, or some other tiny figure) the power to vote in federal elections. It says those residents are permitted to vote by absentee in the state where they last resided. (No word on what happens to those who never resided in another state.)

But this remedy in Section 204 is, in my view, constitutionally suspect. Congress has no power to establish voter qualifications—certainly not under the Elections Clause, as the Supreme Court said in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., and perhaps not elsewhere. Of course, other Supreme Court precedents, like Oregon v. Mitchell, have approved congressional rules on voter qualifications, like reducing the federal voting age to 18 and establishing minimum residency rules for presidential elections. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act does the same, but, as Professor Brian Kalt has, in my view, persuasively argued, is likely unconstitutional (even if exceedingly popular).

For Congress to extend this residual group of inhabitants voting rights—and by compelling states to accept them as voters—would raise, I think, a significant constitutional question. Granted, there’s case law on Congress’s side, as well as a similar (and exceedingly popular) statute for uniformed and overseas citizens—litigation challenging Section 204 might sweep away much more than Section 204. But it remains, I think, a challenge to consider.

Finally, Section 205 is misleadingly titled, “Repeal of law providing for participation of District of Columbia in election of President and Vice-President.” All this does is repeal a conforming amendment to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, which sets the rules for Congress counting electoral votes from the states. It treats D.C. as a “state” for purposes of the rule. Repealing this statute doesn’t really do anything. Congress still has to count votes from D.C. under the Twenty-Third Amendment, if cast; if Congress casts those votes, then it has to count those votes, too, regardless of whether the Electoral Count Act gives express guidance of how to do so. Prior to the Electoral Count Act, Congress built up its own body of rules that, well, collapsed in the Election of 1876. The Electoral Count Act doesn’t “provid[e]” for D.C.’s participation in federal elections, and this section is only a technical provision that helps after the Twenty-Third Amendment is repealed.

In short, there are some election law problems with D.C. statehood absent a repeal of the Twenty-Third Amendment, and other problems that persist for the remaining few inhabitants in the residual district.

Oral argument analysis: Will the Tenth Amendment make a comeback in the faithless electors cases?

A pair of faithless electors cases from 2016 have made their way to the Supreme Court. (Disclosure: I filed an amicus brief on behalf of myself in support of neither party here.) SCOTUSblog posts for Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado Department of State v. Baca are here and here.

The Tenth Amendment argument unfolded in a curious way because of the Court’s new format of oral argument, where justices asked questions one by one.

The framing here is important before we get to the questions. In 1995, the Supreme Court decided U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton. That case held that states cannot add to the qualifications enumerated in the Constitution for members of Congress, because the Constitution fixes the qualifications and states have no power to add to them.

It was a 5-4 decision (written by Justice Stevens, joined by, among others, Justice Kennedy). Among the arguments rejected by the majority was that the Tenth Amendment empowered states to add qualifications. The majority, relying on the work of Justice Story and others, argued that the states had no reserved powers over federal elections, because there were no federal elections prior to the enactment of the Constitution. Instead, all state power over federal elections must come from an affirmative grant in the Constitution. I think that’s the right argument, as I lay out, in part, in Weaponizing the Ballot.

Justice Thomas dissented on behalf of four justices. He argued that the Tenth Amendment did include such a power. He lost, but still—he had four justices who agreed with him.

Fast forward to today. Justice Thomas asked Professor Larry Lessig, who represented petitioner Chiafalo in the first argument, about a reserved powers of the states claim. Washington did not raise a Tenth Amendment, Professor Lessig notes, but regardless the Constitution empowers electors to have certain discretion, which states cannot take away.

Questions when down the line until it reached Justice Kavanaugh, the most junior justice. He also raised the Tenth Amendment argument with Professor Lessig. Professor Lessig notes that Washington didn’t raise it, and there’s no tradition of state power to control presidential electors.

Now, this is a moment. Justice Kennedy had rejected the Tenth Amendment argument in Thornton. Justice Kavanaugh has replaced him and seemed receptive to the Tenth Amendment.

So, oral argument goes back to the top, to the Solicitor General of Washington. And on down the line until it comes to Justice Sotomayor, who takes the opportunity to push back on the Tenth Amendment claim. In a real-time argument, this would probably have happened when Justice Kavanaugh spoke. But she emphasized, “two of my colleagues” raised it, but Washington never did, and it seems a strange reserved power when states never knew they had it.

Then, on back to Colorado’s oral argument. Colorado did raise a Tenth Amendment claim. Justice Kagan pressed, “Why doesn’t Thornton foreclose that argument?”

So Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, in my view, were very much pushing back against the concerns raised by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh (and, speaking with more speculation, specifically Justice Kavanaugh) on the Tenth Amendment.

Justice Gorsuch didn’t weigh in on the Tenth Amendment piece, but I want to highlight n.60 of a law review article he wrote in 1991 on term limits, expressly reserving addressing the Tenth Amendment question that would later be address in Thornton. Not that his former views would offer any insight, but, there, he did believe that term limits are a “manner” of holding elections and within state power. It’s unclear whether his views (or reserved views) from that day would carry over here.

A few other highlights from oral argument.

Limiting principles. It’s hard to overstate how many times the justices asked either side about limiting principles—do electors have unfettered discretion? Can states condition electoral appointments however they want? Both sides continued to exert fairly maximalist interpretations, in my view, rather than a claim more closely hewing to the facts presented. That said, it’s in part because the justices are looking for larger principles. But the frustration was palpable. Chief Justice Roberts asked about casting a vote for a giraffe, and Justice Thomas about a vote for Frodo Baggins. Pressing Washington about the limits of its power, claims like “the Equal Protection Clause” and the like were the boundaries. It’s hard to know if either side made much headway here.

Bribery. Professor Lessig made an important—and, I’m not sure entirely necessary—claim during argument, one that multiple justices later seized upon. If an elector was bribed, could that elector be removed? Only after a criminal conviction, Professor Lessig noted. That seemed a bridge too far for many members of the court, who seemed concerned that a bribed elector could still vote if the wheels of justice hadn’t moved swiftly enough.

Manufactured case. The justices at a few points wondered about Baca in particular as a manufactured case. Justice Breyer pressed both sides on the claim that Section 1983 did not allow a state to be sued, so why should a court hear the case? Both sides argued it was non-jurisdictional and how they wanted to strategically present the case. Justice Alito went a step farther, questioning Professor Lessig’s motivations in helping invite chaos in the 2016 presidential election.

Pragmatism. Many justices—particularly Justices Breyer, Alito, and Kavanaugh, but also in strains of Justices Kagan and Gorsuch—echoed practical concerns of two kinds. First, if a judicial decision would render significant uncertainty or unpredictability, perhaps that decision should not be issued—as Justice Kavanaugh put it, the “avoid chaos” theory of judging. Second, in the absence of very clear guidelines from the Constitution, perhaps the courts should just defer to the state judgment, which sometimes binds electors and sometimes doesn’t. Justice Kagan openly floated this possibility, as she seemed unconvinced by either textual or historical arguments, suggesting deference would be warranted.

In the end, there’s plenty of uncertainty in the two cases. And the justices have… six or seven weeks to sort it all out….

Supreme Court amicus brief in Chiafalo v. Washington

I’ve filed an amicus brief on behalf of myself in support of neither party in Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado Department of State v. Baca. The PDF is here. (Other documents from the case are here.)

The brief makes four points. The first two are reasons federal courts should not hear the case. First, the Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress, not the federal courts, about when and how to count electoral votes. Congress counted the votes cast by Colorado’s and Washington’s electors, and courts should not second-guess Congress’s judgment. Second, Micheal Baca, Colorado’s elector who was replaced, failed to avail himself of political remedies—he never submitted his vote to Congress to consider or asked Congress to count his vote.

The third and fourth points address the scope of the Court’s decision if it reaches the merits. The Court must identify circumstances in which vacancies may arise in the meeting of electors and in which fines can be imposed, because such statutes have been on the books since the Founding. And the Court should not conclude that electors have a right to cast an anonymous ballot, because early state practices and the internal logic of the Twelfth Amendment do not require anonymous ballots.

Can states thwart the National Popular Vote Compact by refusing to disclose their popular vote totals?

I’ve been deeply critical of the National Popular Vote Compact (“NPV”) (for a taste of some reasons, see here). In brief, instead of states choosing the winning slate of presidential electors based on the winner of each state’s popular vote, compacting states (consisting of at least a majority of the Electoral College) agree to choose the winning slate of presidential electors based on the winner of the national popular vote.

But there’s a new effort out that attempts to thwart the NPV if the NPV ever goes into effect—by refusing to disclose some statewide popular vote totals.

Legislators in New Hampshire and South Dakota have introduced bills that would keep the state’s popular vote totals a secret until after the Electoral College meets. That, in theory, would thwart the ability to add up a “national popular vote” total.

But I’m not so sure this will work.

The NPV instructs each member state to total "the number of votes for each presidential slate in each state . . . in which votes have been cast in a statewide popular election"; and "'statewide popular election' shall mean a general election in which votes are cast for presidential slates by individual voters and counted on a statewide basis." It also provides, “The chief election official of each member state shall treat as conclusive an official statement containing the number of popular votes in a state for each presidential slate made by the day established by federal law for making a state’s final determination conclusive as to the counting of electoral votes by Congress.” (Right now, that’s six days before the Electoral College meets.)

That means that if, say, Colorado in 1876 doesn't hold a popular election, there are no popular votes added from the state of Colorado to add. So the Compact counts up the popular votes in as many or as few states as hold elections.

So what if New Hampshire or South Dakota, or some other state, withholds its votes from other states to review? My guess is that there’s no “official statement” of the “popular vote” to treat as “conclusive,” which places no obligation on member states to count those votes in a national popular vote. Alternatively, the compact might be construed to say that there are no “votes . . . counted on a statewide basis” in the event the state chooses not to disclose them prior to the meeting of the electors (technically, of course, they’d be counted secretly, but the implication from the NPV, I think, is that counted and publicly ascertainable is what matters, as other provisions of the NPV suggest).

If that’s the case, New Hampshire or South Dakota wouldn’t be thwarting the NPV. They’d simply be excluded from the “national popular vote” total, as if the legislature chose the electors directly.

Perhaps I’m wrong, and the better interpretation of the NPV is that if a state holds a popular election but refuses to publcly disclose its votes, it would prevent any state from recognizing a “national popular vote” total. But despite my opposition to the NPV for both legal and practical reasons, I’m skeptical this gambit would work.